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IN HARM'S WAY: RESEARCH SUBJECTS WHO ARE
DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED
CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "decisionally impaired" covers a wide variety of condi-
tions that compromise an individual's ability to make knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary decisions about matters that could have serious
consequences on his or her health, safety or welfare. These conditions
can be temporary, as in the case of childhood or unconsciousness;
episodic and intermittent, as in the case of serious mental illness; or
permanent, as in the case of severe or profound mental retardation
and the late stages of Alzheimer's disease, AIDS dementia, Hunting-
ton's disease, and other similar conditions.
This article will address the issue of decisional impairments
caused by serious mental illness in the context of biomedical research
involving human subjects. The decisionally impaired seriously men-
tally ill person shares, in common with other groups of decisionally
impaired individuals, an inability to weigh the risks and benefits of
proposed research, and to reach a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
decision regarding participation in such research. However, there are
aspects of serious mental illness that distinguish it from other cogni-
tively impairing conditions.
The nature and course of serious mental illness, including its on-
set, commonly in late adolescence or early adulthood, and its fluctua-
tion from periods of acute psychosis to periods of relative remission,
place particular demands and strains upon relationships with family
and close friends.' These strains in turn affect the acceptability, avail-
ability, and reliability of family surrogates in the decision-making pro-
cess. Such strains and their effects are not found to the same extent
with other cognitively impairing conditions which are either of a short
term nature (e.g., unconsciousness), a normal part of the life cycle
(childhood), or which occur in an environment of stable family rela-
tionships (e.g., late stage Alzheimer's disease).
* Chairman, New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Dis-
abled. The assistance of Kathryn McKee, Ph.D., in research for this article is acknowledged,
with gratitude.
1. See generally HARMET P. LEFLEY, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN MErTAL ILLNESS (1996).
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Patients' attitudes towards their diagnosis of serious mental ill-
ness vary widely as well. Some patients recognize their mental illness,
have generally positive experiences with mental health treatment, and
welcome and assist in efforts to improve the understanding of their
illness and methods of treatment.' Other patients challenge their di-
agnosis, see treatment as coercion, and report bad and abusive exper-
iences in mental health facilities which they see themselves as having
"survived."' Some patients view their families as their natural allies
and most reliable and enduring support system. Their families repre-
sent their interests when they are unable to. Others see their families
as adversaries who are allied with those who would coerce them into
unwanted and unnecessary treatment. The views and attitudes of per-
sons with serious mental illness are not fixed and static, but may move
to different points between these poles as their family relations,
clinical condition, relationship with professionals, experiences with
treatment, and a variety of other influences affect them.
I1. CONTEXT
The environment in which questions about research involving
decisionally impaired and mentally disabled individuals arise is ex-
tremely important. to an understanding of the issues presented. The
mentally disabled have always been near the bottom of the totem pole
in most areas of public policy. There are numerous examples of policy
issues where persons with mental disabilities are treated unfavorably
compared to others with severe and chronic illnesses. For example,
insurance policies typically place different and tighter restrictions on
coverage for mental illnesses compared to those with other types of
severe and chronic diseases. Another example is Medicaid coverage,
which excludes long-term institutionalization for mental illness in spe-
cialty hospitals while providing coverage for similar hospitalizations
for other illnesses.4 When the New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law studied the need for surrogate decision-making for medical
treatment for persons without capacity, it developed a set of recom-
mendations to address this problem, while specifically excluding resi-
dents of mental health facilities.5
2. See Taking Issue with Taking Issue: "Psychiatic Survivors" Reconsidered, 48 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 601-05 (May 1997).
3. Id.
4. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(l) (West Supp. 1997); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.1008
(1997).
5. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE:
DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY at 174 (Mar. 1992).
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The rules of law, custom, and practice that apply to most of the
rest of medical practice and clinical care often do not apply to mental
health care. In significant respects, persons institutionalized as men-
tally disabled live in a legal enclave, outside the effective protection of
many laws that protect everyone else. There is a long tradition of re-
garding them in this fashion as illustrated by the following examples:
* The legal right that prisoners of war and convicted
criminals have long enjoyed to outdoor fresh air and ex-
ercise6 has been routinely denied in some institutions for
civilly committed mentally disabled patients across
America. It has taken a recent lawsuit to gain some rec-
ognition of this right.
7
" The enforcement of the Penal Laws rarely extends into
institutions where thefts, assaults, and rapes routinely oc-
cur, and go unreported and uninvestigated.8 Even when
reported within the institution, such crimes often go un-
prosecuted and unpunished.'
There is a culture of insularity and limited disclosure that seems
to have permeated many if not most institutions. Notwithstanding a
host of formal requirements for reporting events that occur within
institutions (unusual incidents, medication errors, use of restraints or
seclusion, etc.),1" there are few institutions unaffected by the problem
6. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979); Rhem v. Malcolm,
371 F. Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); see also 7 N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 304.3 (1996) (providing for one hour of outdoor exercise daily
for prisoners of the New York State Department of Correctional Services); The Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (July 27, 1929), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 266 (Dietrich Schindler &Jiri Toman eds., 1973) (providing in Article 13 that
prisoner of war camps "shall have facilities for engaging in physical exercises and obtaining
the benefit of being out of doors").
7. SeeJean D. v. Cuomo, No. 90 CIV. 0861 SS, 1993 WL 276067 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y., July
20, 1993) (resolving a discovery dispute in which patients at mental hospitals alleged that
procedures of the New York Department of Mental Health denied them access to fresh
air).
8. See generally Care of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On the Handicapped of the Comm. On Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm.
On Labor, Health, and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies of the Comm. on Appropri-
ations, 99th Cong., 268-278 (1985) (testimony of Clarence J. Sundram) [Hereinafter Joint
Hearings].
9. See generally NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DIS-
ABLED, IN THE MATTER OF LISA COHEN: THE NEED FOR A POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES SERVICE SYSTEM FOR REPORTING APPARENT CRIMES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN.
ciEs (Apr. 1987); NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED, PATIENT ABUSE AND MISTREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRIC CENTERS: A POLICY FOR REPORTING
APPARENT CRIMES TO AND RESPONSE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (Dec. 1985).
10. See Joint Hearings, sulyra note 8, at 268.
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of under reporting of such events." It is not only that front line staff
may not make the required disclosures to their superiors within the
institutional hierarchy, 2 but also that supervisors can and do exercise
discretion to classify reported events in a manner that exempts them
from disclosure outside the institution." These tendencies exist to the
greatest extent where the events at issue are likely to raise the most
questions: for example, sexual encounters and assaults between
patients.'
4
In this vein, when the New York State Office of Mental Health
(OMH) negotiated a Multiple Project Assurance regarding research
in its institutions, it exempted itself from reporting to federal over-
sight agencies-the following: unanticipated problems involving risks to
subjects or others; instances of serious or continuing noncompliance
with federal regulations, requirements, or determinations of the IRB;
and any suspension or termination of IRB approval for research.'- In-
stead, OMH substituted a requirement that, as a court later found, in
effect had them reporting to themselves.'
The law of informed consent is just one more example of the
different treatment of persons with mental illness. This is the only
group of patients for whom informed consent to treatment is gener-
ally not required and whose assent to treatment is often assumed un-
less they specifically object. For instance, the New York Mental
Hygiene Law requires "consent for surgery, shock treatment, major
medical treatment in the nature of surgery, or the use of experimental
drugs or procedures."17 Pointedly missing from this enumeration of
procedures for which consent is required is psychiatric treatment with
psychotropic medications. Moreover, it is interesting to note that we
discuss the right to "informed consent" that patients have in the con-
text of medical care. In contrast, in the context of mental health treat-
11. See id at 272.
12. See id. at 273.
13. See id. at 275-76.
14. See Clarence J. Sundram, Obstacles to Reducing Patient Abuse in Public Institutions, 35
HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 238 (1984); see generally NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON
QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, SEXUALITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILI-
TIES: AN INVESTGATION OF SEXUAL INCIDENTS AT BERNARD FINESON DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER
(Nov. 1991); NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED,
MANAGING RESOURCES IN THE MENTAL HYGIENE SYSTEM - THE INCIDENT REPORTING ANDRE-
viEw SYSTEM: MORE PROCESS THAN Is DUE (Mar. 1983).
15. See T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 183 (N.Y.App.
Div.1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684
N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), and appeal dismissed by 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997); see
also 28 C.F.R. § 46.103 (b)(5) (1997) (federal reporting requirements).
16. See TD., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
17. N.Y. MENAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(b)(4) (McKinney 1996).
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ment, we refer only to a "right to refuse" or a right to object rather
than a right to informed consent. Until a recent ruling of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Zinermon v. Burch, 8 it was com-
mon practice to accept the consent or acquiescence of a person in the
throes of a psychotic episode for voluntary admission into a psychiat-
ric facility without examining how "informed" or competent this deci-
sion was.' 9
The decades of accumulated experience and aculturalization of
mental health professionals into this type of thinking and practice
poses a formidable obstacle. This is especially true when it comes to
extending these professionals' decision-making past the zone of nor-
mal psychiatric treatment and into the realm of experimentation,
both therapeutic and non-therapeutic. The common practice in
which treating clinicians take on an additional role as research investi-
gators enhances these risks as it brings these attitudes and experiences
into another realm where the issues are far different and the stakes for
the patient may be far higher."0 No wonder that many observers of the
research process have described the researcher's mind-set as impa-
tient with the fussy formalities of informed consent, and as regarding
such "formalities" as hurdles to be overcome rather than require-
ments to be met.2' Furthermore, "the language used in a research
18. 494 U.S. ]33 (1990).
19. See id In Zinermon, the court held that a patient, committed voluntarily to a state
institution in Florida when incompetent to give informed consent, was not precluded from
asserting a claim that staff members of that institution denied patient procedural safe-
guards required by the Constitution for involuntary committment of a mentally ill person.
See id.
20, SeeJay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 12-18
(1993); see also Steve Stecklow & Laura Johannes, Test Case: Drug Makers Relied on Clinical
Researchers Who Now Await Trial; Two Professors Are Accused of Endangering Patients and Stealing
$10 Million, THE WALL ST. J., August 15, 1977, at Al (describing the pressures to recruit
human subjects and the misleading information given to secure consent).
21. Id. Professor Katz characterizes the law of informed consent as a fairy tale myth. See
generally, Jay Katz, Informed Consent: A Fairy Tale? Laws Vision, 39 U. PITr. L. REv. 137 (1977).
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research in its Report and Recommendations: Research Involving Those Institutionalized as
Mentally Infirm, reported "some investigators found the [IRBI review procedure to be an
unwarranted intrusion on the investigator's autonomy . . . impeding the process of re-
search." NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECT-ION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTI-
TUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM 49-50 (DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0006, (1978))
(emphasis added); see also Paul R. Benson et al., Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research:
Preliminary Findings from an Ongoing Investigation, 20 Soc. Sci. MEn. 1331 (1985); Richard
Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap
Between Ethical Thought and Currmnt Practice, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 67, 104 (1986); Richard W.
Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH.
LAw. 455, 476 (1996) ("the informed consent requirement is viewed as a chore and a
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setting regularly slips into the language of clinical care, increasing the
possibility that a potential subject may be confused."22
It is not only the clinician-researcher's experience that com-
promises genuine informed consent to participation in research. Psy-
chiatric inpatients are generally familiar with the limitations on their
power of consent. If they have not had personal experience with being
involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital, they have likely re-
sided on wards with many others who are there involuntarily. Pa-
tients who have attempted to exercise the recently recognized right to
refuse treatment with psychotropic medications 4 have discovered that
when the institution challenges their right, they lose in the over-
whelming majority of cases.25 Thus, psychiatric inpatients may not ap-
preciate the distinction between treatment and research or that they
have a more robust legal right to refuse the latter than the former.
They may therefore have no reason to believe that their refusals to
participate in research will be any more likely to be successful in avoid-
ing the proposed intervention.
One other point must be considered in setting the context. While
there are notable and recent exceptions, especially in the area of ex-
perimental treatment for cancer and AIDS, history is replete with ex-
amples of dangerous experiments being performed on people who
are relatively powerless and vulnerable, a category into which institu-
tionalized mentally disabled persons clearly fall.26 Among the exam-
ples are the following:
ritual, an impersonal incantation, a hur.ried signing of papers.., a subterfuge aimed more
at easing our consciences than at protecting research subjects . ").
22. Evan Gaines DeRenzo, The Ethics of Involving Psychiatrically Impaired Persons in Re-
search, IRB, Nov.-Dec. 1994 at 7.
23. See Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, DHHS. unpublished provisional data, Inventory of Mental Health Organi-
zations (IMHO) and General Hospital Mental Health Services conducted (1994) (unpub-
lished provisional data, on file with the State of New York Commission on Quality of Care
for the Mentally Disabled). According to the 1994 end of the year census for all 24-hour
psychiatric hospital care settings, 43 percent of the 145,220 patients were on involuntary
status. In state and county mental hospitals, 66 percent of the 69,200 patients were on
involuntary status. See id.
24. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Rogers v. Okin, 821 F.2d 22
(1st Cir. 1987); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337
(N.Y. 1986).
25. See, e.g., J. Richard Ciccone et al., Medication Refusal and Judicial Activism: A Reexami-
nation of the Effects of the Rivers Decision, 44 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 555 (1993);
William A. Hargreaves et al., Effects of thejamison-Farabee Consent Decree: Due Process Protection
for the Involuntary Psychiatric Patients Treated with Psychoactive Medication, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 2 (1987);Julie Magno Zito et al., One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State
Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 (1989).
26. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 21, at 104.
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" the deliberate infection of mentally retarded residents of
the Willowbrook State School with live hepatitis virus,
while researchers misinformed their parents that they
were receiving vaccines27 (In addition, consent to this ex-
perimentation was obtained from parents by condition-
ing admission to scarce institutional beds upon their
consent.) ;28
* radiation experiments involving adolescents in a Massa-
chusetts institution for the mentally retarded whose par-
ents were misinformed about the nature of the
experimen t;
29
* the research into malaria, dysentery and influenza during
the second World War in which residents of institutions
for the mentally ill and mentally retarded were frequently
used as human subjects;"°
* the Tuskegee syphilis study in which hundreds of black
men were allowed to languish with untreated syphilis,
and were not informed of the nature of the study or the
availability of treatment;
3 1
* the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital study in which re-
searchers injected live cancer cells into unknowing and
non-consenting patients who were dying of various
chronic and debilitating diseases; 2
* the first lung transplant, whose recipient was John Rus-
sell, a prisoner serving a life sentence for murder who
had serious lung problems.
3 3
27. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFERRED MEDICAl. DECISION MAKING 77 (1991); see also Philip M. Bein, Surro-
gate Consent and the Incompetent Subject, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 739, 756 (1991).
28. See Bein, supra note 27, at 756.
29. See Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report 210-211
(1996).
30. See RorEiMAN, supra note 27, at 33-39.
31. See ROBERTJ. LEVINE, Enics AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 69-70 (2d ed.
1986).
32. See Garnett, supra note 21, at 465.
33. See id. at 482. Another example of research upon a prisoner which was proposed
but never conducted because of a court order was described in Kaimowitz v. Department of
Mental Health for the State of Michigan, No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich. July 10,
1973), reprinted in I MENTAL DISABWLI L. REP. 147 (1976). The prisoner, John Doe, had
been committed to a state hospital as a sexual psychopath. See id. at 147. He signed an
informed consent for psychosurgery, as did his parents, for a research study of uncontrolla-
ble aggression. See id. The research was designed to compare the effects on male hormone
flow of a psychosurgical procedure with those of a particular drug. See id. Although both a
scientific review committee and a human rights review committee reviewed and approved
the proposed experiment, the court blocked it, stating, "Psychosurgery should never be
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the first chimpanzee heart transplant, whose recipient
was Boyd Rush, a poor deaf mute man who did not con-
sent to the transplant when he arrived at the hospital un-
conscious and dying;
3 4
a chimpanzee kidney transplant performed on Jefferson
Davis, a poor black man, who agreed after doctors told
him he would die otherwise; 5
an experimental baboon heart transplant performed on
"Baby Fae," a poor and dying child, with her mother's
consent.
3 6
When the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Research issued its consensus
statement in 1979 on the ethical principles governing human experi-
mentation (commonly referred to as the Belmont Report), it identi-
fied three ethical principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and
justice.31 With respect to justice, the principle requires that the bene-
fits and burdens of research are fairly distributed among groups and
individuals.3" In essence, the Commission stated that the burden of
research should not fall unduly upon relatively disadvantaged groups,
while the benefits that flow from the research accrue to those who are
in a more economically and politically advantageous position.4° Ac-
cording to the Code of Medical Ethics of the American College of
Physicians, "[T]he over-use of institutionalized persons in research is
an unfair distribution of research risks. Participation is coercive and
not voluntary if the participant is subjected to powerful incentives and
undertaken upon involuntarily committed populations, when there is a high-risk low-bene-
fits ratio as demonstrated in this case. This is because of the impossibility of obtaining truly
informed consent from such populations .... " See id. at 148.
34. See GEORGEJ. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE
SuBJECr'S DILEMMA 15-16 (1977).
35. See id. at 15.
36. See GeorgeJ. Annas, Baby Fae: The "Anything Goes" School of Human Experimentation, in
JUDGING MEDICINE 385, 389 (1988). For a review of other experiments of questionable
scientific or ethical value, see Henry Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1354 (June 16, 1966).
37. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0012,
1979).
38. See id. at 4.
39. See id. at 8-10.
40. See Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276
JAMA 67, 71 (July 3, 1996).
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persuasion."4' In institutions it does not take much for an inducement
to be powerful. The adolescents at the Fernald State School for the
Mentally Retarded in Massachusetts, who were recruited to participate
in nontherapeutic experiments involving the ingestion of radioactive
iron, calcium and iodine, were offered a quart of milk daily, trips to
baseball games and the beach, and outside dinners.4" As one of them
later told the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments
(ACHRE), "They bribed us by offering us special privileges, knowing
that we had so little that we would do practically anything for atten-
tion ... ,
In the context of research protection, the widespread view in the
research community apparently was that the American Medical Associ-
ation's Statement of Principle of 1946 regarding voluntary consent of
research subjects," the Nuremberg Code of 1947," 5 the Declaration
of Helsinki adopted by the World Medical Assembly in 1964 and sub-
sequently revised in 1975 and 1983,46 the International Covenant on
41. P inciples of Medical Ethics and Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical Affairs, in
CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY 189, 195 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 2nd ed., 1991).
42. SeeAviWsoRy COMM[rrEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 29, at 210-
11.
43. Id., at 210; see also, American College of Physicians, Cognitively Impaired Subjects, in 3
ANNALS INTERNAL MEDICINE, 843, 846 (1989) (concluding that institutionalized patients
may be more susceptible to positive inducements to give consent, such as a change in living
quarters).
44. See Supplementaty Report of the Judicial Council in Proceedings of the House of Delegates
Annual Meeting, Dec. 9-11, reprinted in 132 JAMA 1090 (1946). The council found that in
order for the Principles of Medical Ethics to conform to the ethics of the American Medi-
cal Association three requirements must be satisfied: (1) the consent of the person on
whom the experiment is being performed must be voluntary; (2) "the danger of each ex-
periment must be previously investigated by animal experimentation, and (3) the experi-
ment must be performed under proper medical protection and management." Id. at 1090.
45. SeeJay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and Now,
in THE NAZI Doc-oas AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTA-
TION at 2 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). The first principle in the
Nuremberg Code reads:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means
that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other alternative
form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and com-
prehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision.
Id. at 2.
46. See WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Declaration of Helsinki in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS - FACING THE 21s'r CENTURY 433 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed.,
1996).
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Civil and Political Rights,47 despite their clear language, could not
have meant to preclude the use of mentally incompetent patients in
experiments, both therapeutic and nontherapeutic. Thus, respected
researchers in respected institutions continued to perform experi-
ments at high levels of risk upon persons with mental impairments,
without any consent at all, and to publish their findings and methods
in respected journals with impunity.4"
Even during the recent surge of interest in the protection of vul-
nerable populations in human subject research, the institutionalized
mentally disabled population once again has been excluded from any
special safeguards. in 1978, the National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research rec-
ommended special protections for the institutionalized mentally
infirm.4 9 While the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(DHEW), the predecessor agency to the current Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), published proposed regula-
tions,5 ° the regulations were never finalized.
In 1981 and again in 1983, the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research urged the promulgation of final regulations to address this
subject. 51 However, the Secretary of HHS declined to do so, report-
edly due to a lack of consensus on the need for them as well as the
alleged adequacy of existing regulations. 52 Most recently, the Advi-
sory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments endorsed the
need for guidelines protecting institutionalized adults of questionable
competence in human subject research.53 At present, the federal reg-
ulations governing human subject research 4 have special safeguards
for children,55 pregnant women, 56 and prisoners.5 However, despite
47. See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). Article 7 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation." Id.
48. See, e.g., Leonard S. Rubenstein, Psychiatric Experimentation: The Lessons of History, 5J.
CAL. ALLIANCE FOR MENTALLY ILL 22, 24 (1994).
49. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 21.
50. See 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950-56 (1978).
51. See RobertJ. Levine, Proposed Regulations for Research Involving Those Institutionalized
as Mentally Infirm: A Consideration of Their Relevance in 1996, IRB, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 1.
52. See id.
53. See ADVIsoRY COMMITrEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 29, at 226,
n.96 (1996).
54. See generally Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R.§ 46 (1997).
55. See id. §§ 46.407-.409.
56. See id. §§ 46.205-.207.
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repeated recommendations from each of the blue ribbon panels ap-
pointed to consider these issues, 58 at present convicted criminals have
better recognition in law of their special vulnerability in human sub-
ject research due to institutionalization than do institutionalized men-
tally disabled persons who carry the additional likelihood of cognitive
impairments. In research, as in many other areas of life, institutional-
ized mentally disabled individuals are once again in a class by them-
selves and disadvantaged by that classification.
When laws and regulations do address the rights and interests of
mentally disabled persons, there is often a prolonged period of simply
disregarding whatever it is in these requirements that is inconvenient.
There are numerous examples of this pattern of behavior including
disregard for laws dealing with requirements for individualized treat-
ment plans, for patient and family participation in treatment plan-
ning, and for discharge planning.59 As Erving Goffman recognized,
there is a wide gulf between the formal life of an institution, which is
replete with rules, regulations, policies and procedures, and the un-
derlife or real life of an institution, which is governed largely by the
demands of convenience.6"
Faced with a mental health professionals' failure to comply with
the laws, mentally disabled persons have a limited ability to advocate
for themselves.6" Their mental impairment also places a cloud upon
their credibility and leads to a discounting of the value of what they
say when they allege violations of law. The- most vulnerable are the
seriously and persistently mentally ill who are often disconnected
from any family or community support system. The nature of their
illnesses and their life experiences often alienate them from others
who may be natural allies, especially their families. Other advocates,
including those provided by the Protection and Advocacy Program,6"
57. See id. §§ 46.304-.306.
58. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 29.15(f) & (g), 33.02(a)(11) (McKinney 1996);
see also Heard v. Cuomo, 594 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1993) (Homeless and mentally ill persons suc-
cessfully sued the state of New York to enforce the state's obligation to take steps to ensure
adequate and appropriate housing is provided upon discharge from the institution.); see
generally DAVIDJ. ROTtiMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNA-
rVEs IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
60. See generally Erving Goffman, Asylums (1962).
61. See Joint Hearings, supra note 8, at 1. According to Senator Lowell WeikerJr., Chair-
man of the United States Subcommittee on the Handicapped "Protection for these frailest
of our society exists largely on paper." Id.
62. See Clarence J. Sundram, Implementation and Activities of the Protection and Advocacy
Program for Persons with Mental Illness, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 702 (1995); see generally 42
U.S.C. §§ 10-801 et seq. (implementing the Protection and Advocacy Program for mentally
ill individuals).
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are in short supply and often experience inordinate difficulty in sim-
ply gaining access to facilities and reliable information.6" The enforce-
ment of their rights and of the laws enacted for their protection is
therefore fraught with difficulty.
All of this context is relevant to thinking about the role of formal
structures like laws and regulations as a solution to whatever problems
currently exist and to the abuses that have been uncovered."4 Any so-
lutions are unlikely to be self-executing and are unlikely to be
respected and obeyed unless there is seachange in attitudes towards
persons with serious mental illness. The history of reforms in mental
health systems shows that accountability comes slowly and only after a
prolonged public spotlight on the habits of the underlife, usually cou-
pled with pressure from the legislative or judicial branches of govern-
ment. Reliance upon professionals alone for change will not suffice.
The strong resistance that has been demonstrated to the reforms pro-
posed in the recent past by Presidential Commissions and to proposed
regulatory reforms indicates how strongly the research community dis-
agrees with the very need for reform, and how difficult it will be to
implement any new formalities.65
III. CURRENT PRACTICE
The history of what has transpired since the responsibility for po-
licing research was given to the relatively invisible institutional review
boards (IRBs) and to a relatively invisible process is instructive.66
63. See Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Developmental Center,
97 F.3d 492 (lth Cir. 1996) (suing to gain access to records of residents who had died
while they were in the facility); Mississippi Protection and Advocacy System v. Cotten, 929
F.2d 1054 (5th. Cir. 1991) (suing to gain access to patients residing therein); Robbins v.
Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479 (D. N.M. 1990) (suing to receive greater access to patient
records); Maryland Disability Law Center v. Mt. Washington Pediatric Hospital, Inc., 666
A.2d 16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (suing to gain access to hospital records for the purpose
of abuse and neglect investigation).
64. See PhilipJ. Hilts, Agency Faults a UCLA Study for Suffering Mental Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1994, at Al, All. The Office of Protection from Research Risks ruled that UCLA
failed to get proper consent from schizophrenic patients in an experiment in which they
were taken off medications and allowed to suffer severe losses. See id.
65. See Garnett, supra note 21, at 48. ( "if we need to perform the experiment in a
difficult case, we will. If necessary, we proceed without consent or with only a perfunctory
acquiescence, which may reflect desperation, resignation, or simply confusion, but cer-
tainly not a robust commitment to human dignity and autonomy."). See also NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARc H, supra note 22, at 113-20.
66. See Evan DeRenzo, Surrogate Decision-Making for Severely Cognitively Impaired Research
Subjects: The Continuing Debate, 3 CAMBIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 539, 545 (1994)
("Problems in the present review system of narrowness, isolated discussions, and having to
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There is of course a clash of competing interests here. On one hand,
there is a strong interest in learning more about disease, illness, and
cures, an interest that is shared by researcher, subject, and family.
The urgency with which this interest is shared probably varies among
these groups with the immediacy of the prospect of direct benefit. On
the other hand is the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of
the subject, an interest perhaps felt most keenly by the research sub-
ject himself.
In dealing with this clash of interests, the law has called for a
balancing of risks and benefits.67 However, the balance struck has
been an imperfect one. This is in part because those with a lot at
stake, the research subjects and their families, have not had much
voice or access in either articulating the interests at issue or in striking
the balance. It is interesting to note that when different groups are
asked to identify people to protect the rights of the decisionally im-
paired, they select different people. For example, federal regulations
require that "[i]f an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vul-
nerable category of subjects, such as . . .mentally disabled persons,
consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more individu-
als who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with
these subjects."' This may be interpreted to mean that IRBs should
include one or more psychiatrists, ethicists, and lawyers. However,
family members are more likely to see the value of other families in
this capacity.69 Nevertheless, primary consumers have been unusually
silent on the issues involved in research using human subjects. This is
perhaps because more pressing issues of day-to-day existence consume
their energies. It is also perhaps because most of this discussion has
taken place in professional journals and other fora that are not readily
accessible to them.
Despite the feeble attempt to bring in an outside perspective to
the process of review, these balancing judgments are made by the re-
searchers in the first instance and by the IRBs in their reviewing ca-
pacity. Thus, such judgments have usually been made through a
process that is inaccessible to and unreviewable by the interested
reinvent the wheel were identified in the recommendations of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study
Ad Hoc Advisory Panel and are as relevant now as they were 20 years ago.").
67. See generally Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1997).
68. Id. § 46.107(a).
69. See Adil E. Shamoo & Diane N. Irving, Accountability in Research Using People with
Mental Illness, 3 AccourTABILiTY REs. 1, 9 (1993).
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stakeholders. Neither process of review has proved to be a reliable
safeguard.70
In theory, there is a detailed and formidable multi-level process
of review and safeguards. In practice, however, there are many gaps
and weaknesses in this system including the following:
(1) the inability of IRBs to meet all the expectations placed
upon them;
(2) the general absence of direct monitoring of research
practices;
(3) the limited role actually played by federal oversight
agencies given the complexity and volume of research
involved; and
(4) the substantial volume of research that lies outside the
reach of federal regulations.
A. Inability of IRBs to Meet Expectations
In 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed federal
oversight systems for protecting human subjects in federally spon-
sored scientific experiments. 7' The GAO concluded that the oversight
procedures are impaired by the workload of the IRBs and the compet-
ing demands upon the time of the unpaid IRB members, coupled
with the sheer number of studies, which necessitates that IRBs spend
only a few minutes of review per study.72 There were reported in-
stances of IRBs reviewing 100-150, and sometimes as many as 200, pro-
posals and ongoing studies in a single meeting.73
Additionally, the GAO found the IRBs' conduct of continuing re-
views were typically either superficial or not done at all.7 ' The heavy
workload requires that IRBs rely largely on investigators' self-assess-
ments in conducting these continuing reviews, creating a risk of selec-
tive reporting of favorable results and withholding information about
70. See generally Douglas K. Martin et al., The Incommensurability of Research Risks and
Benefits: Practical Helpfor Research Ethics Committees, IRB, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 8; Eric M. Meslin,
Protecting Human Subjects from Harm Through Improved Risk Judgments, IRB, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at
7, 8; Peter C. Williams, Success In Spite of Failure: Why IRBs Falter in Reviewing Risks and
Benefits, IRB, May-June 1984, at 1.
71. GENERAL ACCouNTINC OFFICE, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CONTINUED VIGILANCE CRITI-
CAL TO PROTECTING HuMAN SUBJECTS, REPORT No. HEHS-96-72 (Mar. 8, 1996) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
72. See id. at 17-19.
73. See id. at 17.
74. See id.
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deviations from the study protocol."5 Other concerns raised by the
GAO include the lack of independence, and collegial and institu-
tional pressures upon IRB members that cloud their role as a safe-
guard on research practices.7 6
Over the years, the New York State Commission on Quality of
Care has monitored institutions and responded to complaints regard-
ing research at large state-operated psychiatric centers affiliated with
respected medical schools and hospitals in New York State. In the pro-
cess the Commission has seen evidence to confirm the GAO's overall
finding and conclusion that, while there is on paper a multi-level pro-
cess of review and safeguards for human subjects involved in research,
the actual implementation of these processes renders the safeguards
illusory when they are most needed, specifically, when researchers
may not be committed to a rigorous adherence to the letter and spirit
of the law, or may be inclined to cut corners. Additionally, IRBs often
fail to diligently review initial protocols as illustrated by the following
examples.
1. IRB's improperly approved some protocols. New York State
regulations mandate that patients who are deemed "incapable" may
only be placed in non-therapeutic experiments when such experi-
ments "could not be carried out without the involvement of incapable
subjects."77 This provision is apparently intended to strictly limit the
potential use of incapable patients in research, and all the attendant
legal and ethical problems posed by such research. However, after
three research protocols were approved for using incapable subjects
in non-therapeutic experiments, some or all of the patients actually
enrolled in the research were capable subjects. 78 This suggests that (1)
the researcher initially overstated the case justifying research upon in-
capable subjects, (2) the IRB was insufficiently thorough in its scrutiny
of this asserted rationale, (3) the researcher departed from the proto-
col, and (4) the IRB failed to adequately monitor the implementation
of this protocol which was done in a manner inconsistent with the
original justification.
2. IRBs approved protocols with consent forms which omitted
significant information concerning the research procedures. In one
study involving ECT and mania, the consent form did not disclose that
75. See id. at 17-18.
76. See id. at 18.
77. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(d)(6) (1996).
78. See Lowenkron Affidavit, Exhibit W, Sworn to Sept. 9, 1992, Record on Appeal at
2554, T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1996) (No. 5136/
91).
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there would be a withdrawal from medication for 4-7 days with a 7-10
day washout period before starting ECT.79 In another cerebral blood
flow study, the consent form did not disclose that measurements
would be taken during an 8-12 week period during which the patient
would be withdrawn from medications.8 0 In a dopamine agonist study,
patients were not informed of the risk of Neuroleptic Malignant Syn-
drome or the irreversibility of Tardive Dyskinesia as possible side ef-
fects of the neuroleptic medications which were administered as part
of the research protocol.8 " A common side effect of the medication
Sinemet - involuntary movements - was also not included on the
consent form.8 2 Patients in this study were also not informed that tak-
ing Sinemet without a neuroleptic might cause an exacerbation of psy-
chiatric symptoms."s Such information would appear relevant in a
patient population that often fails to take prescribed neuroleptic
medications. 4
Beyond the lack of disclosure of the specific risks entailed in a
particular research protocol, there are more generic risks and harms
that could significantly affect the welfare of patients. Such risks and
harms are rarely ever discussed or disclosed, or required by IRBs to be
discussed or disclosed. First, drug washouts can and do cause relapse
in some mentally ill patients. One report indicates an overall relapse
rate of 54.8% for patients taken off medications during an average
follow-up period of 9.7 months, compared to a 16.6% relapse rate for
patients maintained on medications.8" Even in the first three months
without medication, the relapse rate is 44%.86 The abrupt discontinu-
ation of medications, which occurs in many research protocols, in-
duces a threefold greater risk of relapse than gradual discontinuation
over a period of weeks and months.17 The likelihood of harm to the
human subject under these circumstances not only raises a question
79. See New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Let-
ter of Findings at 6 (May 28, 1987) (on file with author).
80. See id.
81. See New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Let-
ter of Findings at 6 (Nov. 9, 1994) (on file with author).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Drug-free Research in Schizophrenia: An Overview of the Contro-
versy, IRB, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 1, 3.
86. See id. at 3.
87. See id.
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of disclosure, but also implicates provisions of both the Nuremberg
Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. 8
Second, after multiple psychotic episodes, there is a possibility
that there will remain residual impairments or a so-called "toxic" ef-
fect which increases the likelihood of further episodes in the future
and decreases the long-term effect of existing medications.89 Each
such episode may damage the individual irreparably to some extent.
How does one assess or value the wear and tear on family and other
relationships that occur during such episodes? How does the re-
searcher or IRB know which episode might be the straw that breaks
the proverbial camel's back and irreparably severs relationships? Peo-
ple with serious mental illness live in a fragile world of unreliable and
often inaccessible services and uncertain supports. Informed consent
means weighing not only the short-term risks of suicide attempts or
violence, but also the long-term impact on family and other relation-
ships, on estrangement, alienation, and the loss of perhaps the only
reliable safety net for the seriously mentally ill person. The patient
himself is in the best position to assess the severity of these risks, aided
by others involved in his life. But, without clear disclosure of the risks
and conscious evaluation, how does the patient make an intelligent
assessment?
We need to recognize that people with serious mental illness can
decompensate rapidly and lose everything in a very short period of
time. And some of these losses can be irreparable. Indeed, if the drug
washout and ensuing relapse are severe enough, the researcher may
have no choice but to remove the subject from the study. In a world of
scarce resources and multiple and competing demands, people who
88. See Nuremberg Code, reprinted in Krz, supra note 45, at 2. Principles 5 and 10 of
the Nuremberg Code provide that:
5.) No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to
believe that death or disabling will occur; except, perhaps in those experi-
ments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
10.) During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be pre-
pared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to
believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judg-
ment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to
result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
Id.; see also Declaration of Helsinki, reprinted in WORLD MEDiCAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 46,
at 436. Section IlI of the Declaration of Helsinki provides in pertinent part that "(3) The
investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if in his/her judg-
ment it may, if continued, be harmful to the individual; [and] (4) In research on man, the
interest of science and society should never take precedence over considerations related to
the well-being of the subject." Id.
89. R.J. Wyatt, Risks of Withdrawing Antipsychotic Medications, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL.
375 (1991),
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develop severe reputations for violent psychotic behavior are disad-
vantaged in competing for access to services, especially in the commu-
nity. They may thus have to endure prolonged institutionalization.
In seeking informed consent, researchers and IRBs need to be
mindful that, for both patients and families, submission to research
may be viewed as a means of obtaining access to better care than their
financial circumstances would otherwise allow. This is a factor that is
likely to play an increasingly prominent role as managed care and the
rationing of services continues to take hold in the mental health ser-
vice system. With these motivations as possibilities, it is particularly im-
portant to disclose to the patient that his individual care will be
subordinated to the necessary rigidity of a research protocol. Addi-
tionally the patient needs to be informed of the possibility that he may
be admitted to a research protocol but placed in a control group
where he receives no treatment at all. If this is the case, what is the
specific benefit being offered to the patient? It is vitally important to
address this "therapeutic illusion" that many patients have about re-
search, regardless of what is said to them, especially if their consent is
obtained by the treating clinician in his capacity as researcher.9 0
The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments con-
ducted a Subject Interview Study (SIS) of over 1,800 research subjects
and concluded:
One of the most powerful themes to emerge from the SIS is
the role of trust in patients' decisions to participate in re-
search .... [T]hey trusted that their physicians would neve"
endorse options that were not in their best interests. This
trust underscores the tension in the role of physician-investi-
gator, whose duties as a healer and as a scientist inherently
conflict.91
In research that exposes patients to more than minimal risk, the
safeguards for research subjects with decisional impairments should
include capacity assessments by qualified clinicians unaffiliated with
the researcher or the institution, and the disclosure of risks and bene-
fits should be likewise made or supplemented by an independent
educator.
90. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and Therapeu-
tic Misconception, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2, 20 (1987).
91. Advisory Committee on Human Radiation, Research Ethics and the Medical Profession:
Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, 276 JAMA 403, 408 (1996).
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B. Absence of Direct Monitoring by the IRB of the Research Being
Conducted
1. In some instances, the Commission found that researchers
themselves were making the determination of whether patients had
the capacity to consent to participation in the research protocol.
Given the pressures that researchers are under to recruit subjects for
their research,9" and the additional layers of scrutiny that are trig-
gered when a potential subject is determined not competent to con-
sent,93 permitting researchers to play this role exposes patients to
unnecessary risks of improper or questionable determinations of ca-
pacity to consent to participation. As sometimes occurs in other ar-
eas, 9 4 there appears to be a tendency to use a lower threshold of
competence for patients who agree on a course of action that a clini-
cian sees as desirable, than for patients who disagree.
2. In several cases reviewed by the Commission over the years,
there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of
capacity to consent in the face of other documentary information
which raised substantial questions about the patient's level of func-
tioning. For example, in the case of a patient who was found to be
capable of consenting to a dopamine agonist study, progress notes
during the neuropsychological testing, which was a component of the
study, indicated that the patient was "floridly hallucinating and delu-
sional."95 A few days later a social worker's note described the patient
as "unkempt and disheveled and not able to attend vocational pro-
gramming," concluding that the patient remains actively psychotic
and "paces the day hall almost continually, seemingly absorbed in in-
ternal stimuli. 96
At another institution, although the research protocol for the
study expressly excluded patients without sufficient mental capacity to
give informed consent, an examination of five cases chosen randomly
revealed that in two, the treating psychiatrist expressed the opinion
92. See Stecklow & Johannes, supra note 20 (describing the financial pressures to re-
cruit human subjects).
93. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(b), 46.116(e) (1997);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REcs. Tit. 14, §§ 527.10(e)(2), 633.13(a)(3) (1996).
94. See generally Charles E. Schwartz, Medical Decision-Making for People with Chronic
Mental Impairments, in CHOICE & RESPONSIBILrTY LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN SERVICES
FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 135 (Clarence J. Sundram ed., 1994); Bruce J.
Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28
Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991).
95. New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Letter of
Findings 3 (Nov. 9, 1994) (on file with author).
96. Id.
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that the patient was incapable of understanding the contents of the
consent form.97 Yet, both patients were included in the research with-
out further explanation.9"
There seems to be a view that it is appropriate for researchers to
rely upon the general presumption of competence, absent a judicial
finding of incompetence. 99 In my view, this is a misplaced reliance
upon a misunderstood legal concept. Presumptions of competence
are useful in general when one has no information that might suggest
anything to the contrary. However, when dealing with a population of
seriously mentally ill individuals, some of whom have been admitted
to psychiatric facilities involuntarily, and many of whom suffer from
some degree of cognitive impairment, there is a clear duty to conduct
a further patient-specific inquiry about decision-making capacity
rather than relying upon a general presumption of competence
alone. The Supreme Court's ruling in Zinermon v. Burch points to the
hazards of relying upon a presumption alone when the circumstances
place the clinician on notice of a duty of further inquiry.' °0
3. Informed consent documents were approved by the IRB in
an ECT study. 1 ' However, the consent forms actually used by the re-
searchers differed from the approved version. °0 in another instance,
the printed consent forms were largely illegible and confusingly
worded.10
3
4. The IRB's lack of on-going review of the implementation of
the research protocols left patients who were not doing well on the
research protocol without adequate oversight protection. For exam-
97. See New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Let-
ter of Findings 5 (May 28, 1987) (on file with author).
98. See id.
99. Remarks of Dr. John Oldham, Senior Medical Officer of the New York State Office
of Mental Health, Conducting Medical Research on the Decisionally Impaired, conference at the
University of Maryland School of Law (May 28, 1997) (An article based on Dr. Oldham's
remarks is included in this issue of The Journal of Health Care Law & Policy.).
100. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 133, 133 (1990) ("Indeed, the very nature of mental
illness makes it foreseeable that a person needing mental health care will be unable to
understand any proffered 'explanation and disclosure of the subject matter' of the forms
that a person is asked to sign, and will be unable 'to make a knowing and willful decision'
whether to consent to admission.").
101. See New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Let-
ter of Findings 4 (May 28, 1987) (on file with author).
102. See id.
103. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 22, at 48-49. The National Commission
reported that only 5 percent of the informed consent forms from institutions for the men-
tally infirm that it reviewed were complete or nearly complete. It found that consent forms
"tended to be difficult to read. The 'reading-ease' of most of the consent forms was compa-
rable to that found in scholarly, academic material." id.
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pie, following the withdrawal of all medications as called for in one
research protocol, a patient lost 27 pounds.' 4 Although the patient's
food intake was ordered to be closely monitored and fluids to be
forced, medications continued to be withheld for another three
weeks.1 °5 Another patient, approaching discharge at the time he en-
tered the research program, suffered severe decompensation follow-
ing removal from his medications and remained in the hospital an
additional 15 months.'0 6
In a study of the treatment of young children with Downs Syn-
drome with recombinant DNA, the IRB approved two research proto-
cols. 10 7 However, it performed no further monitoring of the
implementation of the research.'0° In the implementation phase, the
researchers substantially departed from the protocol and informed
consent requirements. Some of the deviations follow:
" Twenty-four of the 31 children enrolled in the study were
not eligible based on the Growth hormone responses re-
corded in their charts;10 9
" None of the eligible participants had proper informed
consents;" 0
* Participants were not randomly assigned to treatment or
control groups;"1 '
" The informed consent document downplayed the effects
of the growth hormone on development, misled parents
by purporting to diagnose whether their children had
growth hormone deficiency, and also did not disclose the
experimental nature of the treatment or the risk of
leukemia;11
2
" The failure to assign children to a control group and the
inclusion of ineligible individuals into the study de-
stroyed any potential validity of the study, completely ne-
104. See New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Let-
ter of Findings 4 (May 28, 1987) (on file with author).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See THE INSTITUTE OF BASIC RESEARCH INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD AUDIT OF IRB
APPLICATIONS 91-88, 92-128 AND 93-177: TREATMENT OF DOWN SYNDROME WITH RECOMBINANT
HUMAN GROWTH HORMONE 2-4 (Nov. 14, 1994).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 9.
110. See id. at 13.
111. See id. at 15,
112. See id. at 5.
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gating the possibility of any benefits from the research to
offset the risks to which the children were exposed."'
None of these substantial departures from the approved protocol
and the signed assurances to the IRB were detected until after an edi-
torial was published in a professional journal.' 14
5. There is also a lack of reporting on research activities. When
the New York Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Dis-
abled reviewed one institution's IRB, there were no monthly or an-
nual reports found for any of the protocols the commission
reviewed. 1 5 Furthermore, the minutes of their meetings were so brief
as to be entirely uninformative about the substance of discussions."'
Thus, there was no ready means of reviewing the work of the IRB in
carrying out its important responsibilities.
The point is not simply that IRBs are not monitoring the per-
formance of research they have approved. The GAO report makes a
persuasive argument about the impossibility of such a role for the
IRBs as presently constituted." 7 Indeed, given the composition of the
IRBs, such a role may well be impossible, as well as undesirable, as an
independent check on the conduct of research involving human sub-
jects.11 The larger point, however, is that no one actually monitors
the performance of research. There seems to be an elaborate proce-
dural minuet which creates an illusion of careful safeguards and pro-
tection. However, there is often little behind this facade but the
integrity of the researcher which remains the cornerstone of protec-
tion for the human subject. But as history has revealed time and again,
by itself, this is not a reliable foundation upon which to erect an edi-
fice of protection for the most vulnerable of human subjects.
C. Limited Federal Oversight
These weaknesses of the IRBs are compounded by the absence of
a meaningful role by federal oversight agencies over the actual con-
duct of research. The GAO reported that "little data exists that di-
113. See id. at 17.
114. See id. at 6.
115. New York Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Letter of Find-
ings, at 4 (May 28, 1987) (on file with author).
116. See id. at 4-5 ("In some instances, the IRB minutes were so terse and non-descriptive
that it was impossible to know whether it truly met its legal mandate beyond approving the
initial protocols.").
117. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text
118. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUMMING UP: THE ETHICAL AND
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (Mar..1983).
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rectly measures the effectiveness of human subject protection
regulations."" 9 Indeed, it appears that there is no single place in the
oversight scheme that keeps track of how much research involving
human subjects is actually being performed, the types of such re-
search, or the extent to which they involve incapable subjects.' 20
No data exist on the exact number of IRBs in the country, but
estimates range from 3,000 to 5,000.12' The GAO reported that HHS
has an annual five billion dollar investment through about 16,000
awards involving human subject research. 2 2 HHS carries out its over-
sight functions through the Office for Protection of Research Risks
(OPRR) and the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) in
the Food and Drug Administration.' 21 Only 14 full-time employees in
OPRR are responsible for overseeing protections in these 16,000 re-
search awards.' 2 4 At CDER, the FDA has allocated six full-time
equivalent positions to the Division of Scientific Investigations for the
oversight of IRB inspections. 25
D. Research That Lies Outside The Federal Regulations
Finally, there are gaps in the regulatory scheme between what is
covered by federal regulation and what is left to state regulation. The
Common Rule applies to research "conducted, supported or other-
wise subject to regulation by any Federal Department or Agency which
takes appropriate administrative action to make policy applicable to
such research."' 2 6 It does not affect state or local laws or regulations
which may otherwise be applicable and which provide additional pro-
tections for human subjects.'2 7 These federal regulations depend
upon state laws, for example, to define who may be "legally author-
ized" to consent to research on behalf of a prospective human sub-
ject. 2 State laws, such as Article 24-A of the New York Public Health
119. GAO REPORT, supra note 71, at 2.
120. Conversation by Kathryn McKee, Ph.D., with Dr. Andrea Baruchin, Associate Direc-
tor for Science Policy, Office of Science Policy and Programming Planning, National Insti-
tute of Mental Health (Apr. 9, 1997); see also, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Unchecked"Experiments
on People Raise Concern, N.Y., TMES, May 14, 1997, at Al (quoting R. Alto Charo of the
President's National Bioethics Advisory Commission, who said "[wle have better informa-
tion about animal experiments than we do about human experiments").
121. See GAO Report, supra note 71, at 6.
122. See id. at 2.
123. See id
124. See id. at 6.
125. See id.
126. Protection of Human Subjects, C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1997).
127. See id. § 46.101(0.
128. Id. § 46.102(c).
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Law, do not apply "to the conduct of human research which is subject
to, and which is in compliance with, policies and regulations promul-
gated by any agency of the federal government for the protection of
human subjects."' 29 But, to be in compliance with federal policies and
regulations, research must also comply with state law in obtaining con-
sent from a legally authorized representative. 30 New York State law
has an additional requirement that, in relation to the conduct of
human research involving minors, incompetent persons, mentally dis-
abled persons, and prisoners, the Commissioner of Health must con-
sent to the research.13 '
This complex web of laws, policies and regulations, each of which
refer to and depend upon one another, make it very unclear which set
of provisions govern a particular research protocol. When two under-
staffed, overworked, and overwhelmed governmental organizations
potentially have jurisdiction over a matter, there is a good chance that
each will defer to the other. Much research may fall between the
cracks with no effective oversight whatever. This latter problem is
likely to be a growing issue as federal funding to support research
diminishes and private funding from pharmaceutical companies and
other sources plays an increasing role in human subject research.1 2
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
I-offer three recommendations.
1. There needs to be a common set of rules governing human
subjects research regardless of the source of funds or the auspices
under which research is done. People are at risk not only from feder-
ally funded research, but from an increasing volume of research that
is privately funded. A recent article in The New York Times reported
that this research has created a new phenomenon - Commercial Re-
view Boards - that has generated a wave of IRB shopping by research-
ers.13 The current system of federal regulation which covers federally
funded research, and a patchwork quilt of state regulations, leaves
many voids and inconsistencies in the rules governing research, which
129. NEW YoRK Pua. HEALTH LAW, § 2445 (McKinney 1997).
130. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(i!) ("The informed consent requirements in this policy are
not intended to preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws which require addi-
tional information to be disclosed in order for informed consent to be legally effective.").
131. See NEW YoRK PUB. HEALTH LAW, § 2444(2).
132. See Stolberg, supra note 120, at Al, A16.
133. See id. at A16; see also Stecklow & Johannes, supra note 20 (describing 44 trials in
which researchers sought approvals from outside IRBs, including one 2500 miles away,
rather than going through the on-campus IRB of the Medical College of Georgia).
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themselves foster confusion in a highly complex arena.' s4 A common
set of rules could be achieved either by enactment of comprehensive
federal legislation or through an approach similar to the adoption of
uniform state laws as are currently in place in many other subject ar-
eas such as commercial codes.
Any set of rules, however, will be subject to interpretation and
application. At present, IRBs have great discretion in their definition
and application of the terminology of regulations. Given the mind-set
of IRBs and researchers as described earlier, with a bias in favor of
research, and an impatience with bureaucratic procedures that im-
pede or delay research efforts, it is not unreasonable to be concerned
that this discretion will be exercised to classify terms in a manner that
assures the smoothest approvals and a minimum of avoidable disclo-
sure.' But even the most conscientious of researchers and IRBs,
working in good faith, would find it difficult to wade through a legal
minefield of ambiguity inherent in the current laws and regulations.
It is important that a common set of rules be accompanied by practice
commentaries that provide more concrete guidance in the application
of the rules. Over time, the publication and continued updating of
such commentaries, based on actual experiences of IRBs could pro-
mote a common understanding of and practical guidelines for deal-
ing with issues such as the following:
* What is an "experiment?" Is the unlabeled or unconven-
tional use of a medication that has been approved by the
FDA for another purpose an experiment requiring com-
pliance with a research protocol?
* What is "therapeutic" research? Is it sufficient to classify a
research protocol as "therapeutic" if the participants in
that research derive incidental benefits such as full medi-
cal workups that are unrelated to their condition but nec-
essary for the research itself, although the goal of the
research is unrelated to a direct benefit to the individual?
" What is a "benefit" of research that must be balanced
against the risks entailed? Is it sufficient to argue, as the
researchers in the Tuskegee syphilis study did, that the
benefits included free aspirin, "spring tonics," a $50 bur-
ial payment, and the psychological reassurance of having
people come all the way from Washington to examine
134. See DeRenzo, supra note 66, at 543.
135. See Williams, supra note 70.
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them periodically,' or to argue, as did the research
team at Willowbrook, that the benefits offsetting the de-
liberate infection of residents with live hepatitis virus in-
cluded being placed on wards which were cleaner, better
supervised and had a much higher nurse to resident ratio
than the general wards?'" 7
* What is a "risk?" Does this include only the immediate
and specific harm that could directly result from the ex-
perimental procedure, or does it also include ancillary
risks and harm to the subject and his long-term welfare,
including relationships with family members and
others.13 '
" What is "an adverse consequence" which requires report-
ing to the OPRR?. s9 For example, is it appropriate not to
report the death of a patient known to be at high cardiac
risk who was placed in a study on the effect of deprenyl
without a screening electrocardiogram, and died from
what the medical examiner's report characterized as a
sudden cardiac event? In one reported incident, the pa-
tient was taking other medications in addition to the
deprenyl in the experiment and had chronic blood pres-
sure changes.' 40  However, the researchers concluded
that it was highly unlikely that his death was related to the
research, and no report was filed with the FDA despite a
recommendation to do so from the incident review
committee. 
4 1
* What is a "minimal risk?"' 42 The effect of characterizing
an experiment as presenting minimal risks is that the IRB
may approve a consent procedure that alters some or all
of the informed consent elements listed in the federal
regulations, or the IRB may waive the requirements en-
tirely. 4 The IRB controls the process of both analyzing
136. DavidJ. Rothman, Were Tuskegee and Willmobrook "Studies in Nature?, "1982 HAsTINGS
CENTER REP. 5, 6 (Apr. 1982).
137. See id.
138. See Meslin, supra note 70, at 8.
139. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(4), (5) (1997).
140. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants to New York State Court of Appeals at 20-21, T.D. v.
New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1996) (No. 5136/91).
141. See id. at 20-21.
142. 45 C.F.R. § 46.10 2 (g); see a/soJessica Berg, Legal and Ethical Complexities of Consent
with Cognitively Impaired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 18, 24
(1996).
143. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 21, at 125; Williams,
supra note 70.
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the risks and characterizing them."' How do researchers
and IRBs characterize research protocols involving drug
washout periods or double blind randomized trials with
placebos? Do lumbar punctures and PET scans fall in the
category of "minimal risk," "a minor increase over mini-
mal risk," or "more than minimal risk?"
2. The IRB process and its decisions must be made more visible
and accountable to more than just the research community. A massive
federal oversight presence in human subject research is neither possi-
ble nor desirable. However there are alternatives that could accom-
plish the goal of accountability. Among these alternatives are
expanding the membership of IRBs to require representation of pri-
mary consumers, family members, advocates and ethicists who are in-
dependent of the institutions with which the researchers are affiliated.
Additionally, the reports of the IRBs should routinely be made avail-
able to important stakeholder groups as a means of informing them
about the research being undertaken, and the results and adverse
consequences of the research. The groups should include consumer
and family organizations, advocacy organizations, and relevant state
legislative committees overseeing health and mental health services.
The dissemination of these reports more broadly would: (a) create an
expectation that the reports be more informative than they are at
present; and (b) inform constituencies besides the research commu-
nity of the benefits, risks and adverse consequences of research, and
issues such as the classification of research and the interpretation of
key terms in research regulations.
3. Finally, there should be a serious reconsideration of whether
there is any justification at all for non-therapeutic research which ex-
poses incapable people to significant risks, especially when they have
not explicitly authorized a proxy to consent on their behalf to speci-
fied types of research. While competent adults are free to make mar-
tyrs of themselves in the cause of science, they do not have the license
to make martyrs of other people by volunteering them for experi-
ments that expose them to significant risks, especially when those ex-
periments cannot do them any good. The authorization for such
research must reliably and authentically find its source in the exercise
of free will by the subject when competent. Henry Beecher, who wrote
a pioneering work on abuses in research, noted:
Ordinary patients will not risk their health or their life for
the sake of "science." Every experienced clinician knows this.
144. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 21, at 125.
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When such risks are taken and a considerable number are
involved, it may be assumed that informed consent has not
been obtained in all cases.... I have worked on the ward of
a large hospital for 35 years, [and] I know perfectly well that
ward patients will not ... volunteer for any such use of them-
selves for experimental purposes when the hazard may be
permanent injury or death. 145
Why is it that some countries like Great Britain and states such as
California, Massachusetts, Illinois, Connecticut and many others
146
can ban such research entirely? What price do they pay for these deci-
sions? What is the force of the evidence of need for non-therapeutic
research upon incapable human subjects, especially when there are
examples of such protocols later being used solely with capable
subjects?147
In this regard, the recent report of the Advisory Committee on
Human Radiation Experiments is instructive:
The Advisory Committee reserved its harshest criticism for
those cases in which physicians used patients without their
consent as subjects in research from which the patients could
not possible benefit medically .... The heart of the Hippo-
cratic ethic is the physician's commitment to putting the in-
terests of the patient first. Subjecting one's patient to
experimentation that offers no prospect of direct benefit to
the patient without his or her consent is a direct repudiation
of this commitment.... Because risks to subjects cannot be
offset by the possibility that they might benefit medically,
nontherapeutic research that puts subjects at significant risk
is rarely justifiable. Participation in such research is always a
burden and never a benefit to the individual subject, making
questions of justice straightforward as well.' 48
By permitting surrogate consent for non-therapeutic research on
incapable subjects who have not previously selected and empowered
the surrogate while competent, we are once again placing mentally ill
persons in a class by themselves - the only people who now appear to
have a duty of beneficence that no other citizen has - and a duty
145. Letter from Henry K. Beecher to Joseph Sadusk, June 7, 1965, quoted in ROTHMAN,
supra note 27, at 75.
146. See Bein, supra note 27, at 741-42; see also Brief for Proposed Amicus Curiae The
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law et al., at 35-37, T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental
Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (No. 5136/91).
147. See supra, note 80 and accompanying text.
148. ADViSORv CoMMirrEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 29, at 406,
408.
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exercised by someone else not of their choosing. In non-therapeutic
research, the primary benefit to the subject is altruism. But if the sub-
ject is not competent and is unknowing about what is being done, and
has never expressed this desire, what is the benefit?' 49 The courts
which have been confronted with the question of the legality of this
practice have been strong in their repudiation of it. 5 '
In a related vein we also need to make a serious effort at the na-
tional level to define types of research that simply should not be done
regardless of who is willing to consent, i.e., experiments that should
not be done not only because the subject lacks the ability to consent,
but because there is something fundamentally wrong with the experi-
ment itself. We unfortunately have a history replete with examples of
experiments done on human beings which are rightly condemned
simply for the assault on human dignity that they represent. While it is
easy to include the Nazi experiments and the experiments performed
by Japanese during the Second World War as examples of such re-
search that should not be done, there obviously has been less consen-
sus that both the Tuskeegee Syphilis study and the Willowbrook
Hepatitis study might also fit into such a class. In the latter cases, IRBs
have not proved an effective safeguard.
A survivor of Mengele's experiments on twins wrote:
If a human being is ever used in the experiments, the scien-
tist must make a moral commitment never to violate a per-
son's human rights and human dignity.... [T]he scientists
of the world must remember that research is being done for
the sake of mankind and not for the sake of science; scien-
149. See Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person 14 (1970).
150. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684
N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), and appeal dismissed by 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997). The
court wrote:
We are not dealing here with parental choice among reasonable treatment alter-
natives, but with a decision to subject the child to non-therapeutic treatments and
procedures that may cause harmful permanent or fatal side effects. It follows
therefore that a parent or guardian, let alone another adult who may be a mem-
ber of the child's family, may not consent to have a child submit to painful and/
or potentially life threatening research procedures that hold no prospect of bene-
fit for the child and that may have the same result as a denial of necessary medical
treatment.
Id. at 192. The appeal in this case to the NY Court of Appeals was dismissed, and this lower
court opinion was characterized as an inappropriate advisory opinion that was not neces-
sary to grant the plaintiffs the relief they sought. See T.D., 1997 WL 785461 (N.Y. Dec. 22,
1997).
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tists must never detach themselves from the humans that
they serve.
151
In my view, such categorical limits, difficult as they might be to
define and to accept, may be necessary to curb some of the risks to
human subjects, and as a supplement to the current process of relying
on the notion of informed consent from or on behalf of someone who
is incapable of personal consent.
In conclusion, as one who has spent a substantial portion of my
adult life working with people with mental disabilities and their fami-
lies, I know how important a place research holds in offering hope of
greater understanding, control, and perhaps a cure for mental disabil-
ities. I share the view that progress has been too slow in coming, and
that in funding research, as in many other aspects of public policy,
mental disabilities have been a relatively low priority. I share the impa-
tience of families who are desperate for relief from the unimaginable
suffering both they and their afflicted relatives endure. But I am also
mindful of the cautionary words of Justice Brandeis, "The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding." '52
151. Eva Mozes-Kor, The Mengele Twins and Human Experimentation: A Personal Account, in
THE NAZi DOCrORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RI;HTs IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTA-
TION at 2, 53 & 58 (GeorgeJ. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
152. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (BrandeisJ., dissenting).
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